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NOTES

TinkerTortured:The Scope of Student Off-Campus Viral
Speech Rights in the Federal Circuits
Kevin Nathaniel Troy Fowle'
INTRODUCTION

On January 15, 2016, John Reinhart published a memorandum on the Easton
Area School District's website for students' parents to read Reinhart was (and is
still) the superintendent of the school district, which is located in Easton,
Pennsylvania.' The memorandum concerned a recent outbreak of student fights
and confrontations that had transpired at the schools. 4 In fact, twelve fights had
occurred at the district's middle and high schools in less than ten days.' School
administrators were taking every course of action available to curb the eruption of
student brawls.6 To wit, additional adult supervisors were authorized to help secure
areas of heavy student movement, such as hallways and bus lots.' Moreover, every
single student involved in the fights was suspended, with some expulsion
proceedings still pending at the time the letter was written-both punishments that
Superintendent Reinhart described as a last resort.'
Under normal circumstances, such extensive actions on behalf of the school
administration might have been more than enough to end the surge of fights and
return the school to normalcy. But it was not enough here. ' In the web
memorandum, Reinhart urged that "District personnel [could not] act alone in

'University of Kentucky College of Law, J.D. Candidate May 2016. For Kevin & Denise,
Benjamin, and Allison.
2 Letter from John Reinhart, Superintendent of Sch., Easton Area Sch. Dist., to parents, guardians,
and
students
(Jan.
15,
2016),
http://www.eastonsd.org/data/files/galery/ContentGallesy/Parent-Letter_11516.PDF.
3 Id.; Administration, EASTON AREA SCH. DISTRICT, http://www.eastonsd.org/abouteasd/administration/index.aspx (last visited May 22, 2016).
4Reinhart, supra note 3.
5 Manual Gamiz, Jr., Social Media Blamed for a Dozen Fights at Easton Schools, MORNING
CALL (Jan. 16, 2016, 3:42 PM), http://www.mcall.com/news/breaking/mc-c-easton-school-fights20160116-story.html.
6 Reinhart, supra note 3; see also Gamiz, Jr., supra note 5.
7
See Keleigh Gibbs, Social Media Fucling "PhysicalAltercations'inEaston Area School District,
69 NEWS WFMZ-TV (Jan. 16, 2016, 6:29 PM), http://www.wfmz.com/news/news-regionallehighvalley/social-media-fueling-physical-altercations-in-easton-area-school-district/37473136;
see
also Reinhart, supra note 3.
1 Rudy Miller, 12 Fights in 10 Dajs Spurred by Social Media at Easton Area Schools,
LEHIGHVALLEYLIVE
(Jan.
16,
2016,
9:01
AM),
http://www.lehighvalleytive.com/easton/index.ssf/2016/01/socialmedia comments instigat.html.
' See id. ("Efforts to quell the violence are stalled in part because the messages sent on Kik
disappear before administrators can view them.").
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remediating this issue,"1" and indicated that parents would have to play a primary
role in extinguishing the fights that were occurring on a daily basis. 1 While parents
of students certainly maintain a crucial responsibility in how their children behave
on school grounds, to some extent, they are powerless once their child is out the
door. The fights in the Easton Area schools, for instance, presumably occurred
during normal work hours while the parents were likely miles away from the school
grounds. Why then did Superintendent Reinhart repeatedly stress the vital
importance of school parents in ending the violent outbursts? 2 Because many of
the fights had in part originated off school grounds.1 3 Every single one of the fights
had been instigated by prior social media posts and comments made by students on
platforms such as Instagram, Snapchat, and Twitter. 4 Many of the posts had been
made while the students were away from the school.'5
One reaction to the dilemma faced by the Easton Area School District
Administration might be that school administrators should get ahead of the eight
ball by punishing the students who made the social media posts immediately,
instead of waiting for a fight to occur before taking disciplinary actions. At first
blush, this seems like a perfectly reasonable approach to redressing a situation that
puts students' wellbeing at risk. But the implications of punishing a student for
viral speech that occurred away from school grounds before any tangible disruption
in the school occurred makes some uncomfortable, including at least one circuit
judge.' 6 The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment states that "Congress
shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of speech." 7 At least one survey
suggests that many Americans think freedom of speech is the most important
freedom that U.S. citizens enjoy.' 8 Moreover, in the same survey, a majority of
Americans responded that they believed that high school students should be free to
exercise free speech to the same degree as adults.' 9 Deciding cases with freedom of
speech implications for which student lives are obviously at stake has generally been
a more clear-cut decision in favor of the school districts, and rightfully so.20 But
how should courts reconcile the benefits of the "marketplace of ideas" theory of free

10See Reinhart, supra note 3.
1
'

See id.
'2See id.
13

See Miller, supra note 8.

14Id
1

5

Id.

16See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 219-22 (3d Cir. 2011) (Jordan, J.,

concurring).
amend. I.
113496 Say FIrst Amendment Goes Too Far in Protecting Rights, FIRST AMEND. CTR.(July 16,
2013),
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/34-say-first-amendment-goes-too-far
("Americans
identified freedom of speech as the most important freedom that citizens enjoy (47%).").
19
Id.
17U.S. CONST.

" See, eg, Wynar v.Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1069-70, 1072 (9th Cir. 2013);
LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2001).
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speech 2 with the possibility of preventing the less dangerous, but nevertheless
disruptive, incidents' that disturb the school day?
The question has become more complicated as advancements in technology
have transformed and multiplied the fact patterns that courts are faced with.
Perhaps the most prominent example in the student speech context is that of an
academic institution's authority to punish its students for off-campus viral speech,
in light of students' abilities to interact with one another regardless of geographic
proximity to either the school's location or the students themselves.' While the
Supreme Court has taken the firm position that students do not "shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,"24
a different question arises when students' online or digital conduct outside of the
school nevertheless impacts or threatens what happens inside the school.2" In this
light, to what extent should courts be willing to shelter students' freedom of speech
protection under the First Amendment from school interference?
In answering this question, the circuit courts have molded differing thresholds
and used differing criterion to determine whether such speech falls within a
school's authority to control or hand down punishment to its students. This note
analyzes the advantages and shortcomings of these varying circuit standards and
advocates for the most effective and beneficial method for determining the scope of
a school's authority over off-campus viral speech under the First Amendment. Part
I discusses the Supreme Court's rule (and its accompanying exceptions) concerning
student speech rights while on-campus and the common struggle of circuit courts
in applying the Court's precedent in off-campus speech cases. Part II provides an
analysis of the thresholds and criteria the federal circuits have developed in their
21 The "marketplace of ideas" theory is generally defined by an idea that "robust debate, if
uninhibited by governmental interference, will lead to the discovery of truth, or at least the best
perspectives or solutions for societal problems." Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A
LegitimizingMyth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 2-3 (1984). The Court seemed to use this theory as a basis for
their decision in a landmark student free speech case. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
22One example of such incidents could include cyber-bullying. SeegenerallyChrisBrooke, One in
Four Children Targeted by Cyber Bullies With 350,000 Suffering Persistent Torment, DAILY MAIL
(Feb. 5, 2012, 7:10 PM), http://www.dalymail.co.uk/news/article-2096968/One-children-targetedcyber-bullies-350-000-suffering-persistent-torment.html.
2 Seegenerally STEVE DUCK & DAVID T. McMAHAN, COMMUNICATION IN EVERYDAY LIFE:
A SURVEY OF COMMUNICATION 276 (2d ed. 2015) ("Cell phones position people as being constantly
connected and constantly available to others .... The ability to make instant contact with another
person regardless of geographic location creates a symbolic connection unlike that created by any
previous communication technology."). Communication-broadening devices like cellphones have
garnered a particular importance in the lives of students. See Katrina Schwartz, What Happens When
Teens Try to Disconnect hrm Tech For Three Das, KQED NEWS (Mar. 6, 2015),
http://blogs.kqed.org/mindshift/2015/03/turned-off-how-teens-respond-to-a-no-tech-chauenge/
(discussing growing teen dependence on electronic devices such as cellphones).
24 Tinker,393 U.S. at 506.
2 This line, in fact, is the exact issue the lower courts have wrestled with in student free speech
cases. See, e.g., cases discussed infra Part II.
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respective seminal cases of students' off-campus, online speech.26 Part III provides a
solution that involves combining the principles set out by the Supreme Court for
on-campus student speech cases with the Brandenburg v. Ohio test for inciting
lawless action. Primarily, this combination results in a higher threshold for the
student's intent behind the speech than most of the circuit courts have utilized,
while raising the requisite level of foreseeability of disrupted school proceedings
that school administrators must procure before discipline may occur without a
constitutional violation.
I. THE TINKER DOCTRINE, ITS EXCEPTIONS, AND ITS REACH INTO OFFCAMPUS AND DIGITAL STUDENT SPEECH

This section examines the judicial origin of student speech rights while oncampus and subsequent jurisprudence. Part L.A discusses Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School Disttict, the leading Supreme Court Case on
student free speech rights while on the school campus. Part I.B discusses the
exceptions the Supreme Court has found regarding Tinker. Part I.C discusses the
differing ways lower courts have utilized Tinker in dealing with off-campus speech
cases.
A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Distict
The origin of students' First Amendment rights can be traced back to Des
Moines, Iowa. In December 1965, a group of Des Moines residents met at the
home of Christopher Eckhardt, a high school student. 27 Adults as well as students
were present at the meeting. 28 During the meeting, the group decided that they
would protest the Vietnam War and demonstrate their support for its cessation
through a truce. 29 All of the members agreed that they would wear black armbands
in school during the holiday season, concluding on New Years Day, and would fast
on two dates during the month of December. 30 The principals of the protesting
students' schools learned of the plan in advance and agreed to adopt a policy that
any student wearing an armband to school would be required to remove it or face
11The cases considered in this note have been identified by several scholars as some of the cases that
best exemplify the varying treatment that off-campus digital speech has received from the circuit courts.
See generally, e.g., Martha McCarthy, Cyberbullying Laws and lst Amendment Rulings: Can They
Be Reconciled?, 83 MISS. LJ. 805 (2014); Anika Hermann Bargfrede, Note, Demolishing the
Schoolhouse Gate: Tinkering With the ConstitutionalBoundaries of Punishing Off-Campus Student
Speech, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1645 (2015); Daniel Marcus-Toll, Note, Tinker Gone Viral: Diverging
Threshold Tests For Analyzing School Regulation of Off-Campus Digital Student Speech, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 3395 (2014).
27 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
2

8 Id.

29
3

Id.

0 Id.

2015-2016]

Tinker Tortured

suspension until they complied.31 Christopher, John Tinker, and Mary Beth Tinker
elected to carry out the plan despite the school policy and were all suspended from
32
their respective schools until New Year's Day.
The students' parents filed a complaint in a United States district court, alleging
a violation of the students' right of free speech under the First Amendment.33 The
court dismissed the complaint, finding that the school's disciplinary actions in
attempting to prevent school disturbance had been reasonable. "4The Eighth
Circuit affirmed on appeal, 3" and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 36 The
Supreme Court noted that school attendees, ranging from students to principals,
do not abandon their constitutional rights at the school steps.37 Nevertheless, the
Court also acknowledged that the issue of the case arose out of the apposite
compelling axioms of student free speech and the power of school administrators to
regulate what happens inside the school walls.3" The Court stated: "Our problem
lies in the area where students in the exercise of First Amendment rights collide
"
with the rules of the school authorities. 3
The district court held that the school principals were justified in their actions
because they were based on the reasonable fear of school disruption as a result of
the armbands.' ° The Supreme Court, however, decided that the mere fear of
disruption was too shallow of a threshold to maintain. 41 Instead, the Court
considered the relatively passive nature of the protest.42 Dawning black armbands
was not an actively disruptive gesture in the eyes of the Court.43 A school policy
seeking to avoid the "unpleasantness" that accompanies bare disagreements or
differences of opinion, the Court found, was an unreasonable restriction on student
free speech."
The Court implemented a higher threshold for determining when school
authorities may constitutionally limit student-speech and expression, requiring a
showing that the speech must reasonably lead school administrators "to forecast
substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities."45 In the
absence of such a showing, the Court held that school administrators may not

31

Id.

32 id.
33

d.

34Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
35

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967).
' Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 390 U.S. 942 (1968).
37 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
31Id. at 507.
39 1d.
40Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 973 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
41 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
42
See id.
4 See id.
44
Id. at 514.
45
3

Id.
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restrict students' constitutional freedom of expression inside of school walls. 6 The
Court found that no such showing was made by the Des Moines school
administrators, that the anti-armband policy was therefore in violation of the
students' constitutional rights, and reversed and remanded to the lower courts to
determine what relief should be granted.47
B. Limiting andExpanding the Tinker Threshold
Since the Tinker ruling in 1965, the Supreme Court has restricted the scope of
the substantial disruption threshold in subsequent cases, while at the same time,
the Circuit Courts of Appeal have wrestled with how and whether or not to
broaden it in new and developing arenas where student freedom of expression and
school authority to regulate collide. The Supreme Court has relied on two primary
rationales in cases where it has either severely curtailed the use of the Tinker
doctrine or held it entirely inapplicable. The first concerns the content and value of
the speech, and the second concerns the mode and forum of the speech.48 These
rationales are best explained with reference to the particular opinions in which they
originally appeared.
In 1983, a student at Bethel High School named Matthew Fraser gave a speech
at a school assembly in which he supported his classmate in his campaign for a
student elective position.49 Throughout his speech, Fraser relied on poorly veiled

Id. at 509, 514. While most courts have interpreted Tinker under a substantial disruption
standard, others have argued that a second.prong exists that protects speech to the extent that it does
not collide with the rights of other students. Jessica K. Boyd argues that renewed focus on this prong
may help to address the student viral speech issue at the heart of this note. Jessica K. Boyd, Note,
Moving The Bully From The Schoolyard To Cyberspace: How Much Protection Is Off-Campus
Student Speech Awarded Under The FirstAmendment?, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1215, 1237-40 (2013).
47 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
41See Marcus-Toll, supra note 26, at 3404. In this piece, the author asserts that liability for schools
in student-on-student discrimination in the Title IX context has created another exception to the
7inker doctrine. Id. at 3395-96. The author contends that the standard for discrimination in this
context should be used to decide student off-campus digital speech rights. Id. Indeed, several scholars
have crafted differing threshold tests for or acknowledged the issue addressed by this Note. See, e.g.,
Nathan S. Fronk, Note, Doninger v. Niehoff An Example of Public Schools' Paternalismandthe OffCampus Restriction of Students' FirstAmendment Rights, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1417 (2010);
Mickey Lee Jett, Note, The Reach of the Schoolhouse Gate: The Fate of Tinker in the Age of Digital
Social Media, 61 CATH. U. L. REv. 895 (2012); Justin P. Markey, Enough Tinkering with Students'
Rights: The Need for an Enhanced First Amendment Standard to Protect Off-Campus Student
InternetSpeech, 36 CAP. U. L. REv. 129, 135 (2007). While these pieces provide additional potential
answers to the student viral speech issue (in addition to Jessica K. Boyd's proposed schema discussed
earlier), this note contends that a test combining Tinker with elements from the imminent lawless
action test espoused in Brandenburg v. Ohio provides the best solution for protecting and balancing
student speech rights with school administrators' ability to maintain school proceedings. The benefits
and application of such a test, including what evidence courts should consider in determining whether it
has been met, is more fully discussed in Part III of this note.
4' Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677 (1986).
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sexual innuendos and language to make his point.5 ° The school suspended Fraser
for three days, citing a previously established disciplinary rule that prohibited
obscene language. 51 Fraser brought suit against the school district, alleging a
violation of his right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment.5 2 Relying
on the Tinker doctrine, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that
the school's disciplinary actions against Fraser violated his First Amendment rights,
noting that it found essentially no difference between Fraser's speech and the Des
Moines students' decision to wear black arm bands, and rejecting the School
District's argument that the campaign speech was substantially disruptive.53 On
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, relying on the content of the speech itself,
stating that "[a] high school assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit
" 4
monologue directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students. 1
The Court reached a similar result in Morse v. Frederick55 In 2002, at a
school-sponsored event in which Juneau-Douglas High School students were
excused from class to view the Olympic Torch Relay as it passed through Juneau,
Alaska, a student named Joseph Frederick and other students unfurled a banner
that read "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS."56 The relay took place off-campus, but the
Court nevertheless viewed it as a school sanctioned event.17 The school principal,
Deborah Morse, who was also in attendance, immediately demanded that the
students remove the banner, with only Frederick refusing to comply." Morse
subsequently suspended Frederick for ten days because she believed Frederick had
violated a school policy prohibiting any student assembly that promoted illegal drug
use.59 Frederick filed suit alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights and
the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school board and
Morse;6 but the Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment on appeal, finding that the
school had not made a showing that Frederick's banner risked substantial
disruption of school activities, as required by Tinker.61 In reversing the Ninth
Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the school board and
Morse's contention that the banner was aimed at promoting illegal drug use-after
noting that illegal drug use by minor students was a serious and considerable
problem across the nation, the Court found that the Constitution "allow[s] schools

50

See id at 677-78.

51Id.at 678.
52

Id.at 679.
"' Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist., 755 F.2d 1356, 1360-61, 1365 (9th Cir. 1985).
14Faser,478 U.S. at 685, 687.
"
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
5
6 Id.at 397.
57Id. at 397, 400.

s1Id.at 398.
59Id.

60Id.at 399.

61 See Frederick

v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1115, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2006).
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to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug
62
use."
The Court created another limit of the applicability of the Tinker standard in
Hazelwood School Districtv. Kuhlmeier.63 However, unlike Fraserand Frederick,
the Court in Kuhlmeier found an exception in the vehicle of the speech, rather
than the content of the speech itself. The plaintiffs in Kuhlmeierwere former high
school students in St. Louis County, Missouri, who were members of the school
newspaper. 64 The newspaper, although managed by students, was largely funded by
the St. Louis Board of Education.65 The newspaper's practice was to submit the
articles to the principal for approval prior to publication.66 The principal objected to
two particular articles that were to be published in a spring issue. 67 The first had to
do with pregnant students at the high school and their experiences in handling
teenage pregnancy, and the second had to do with the effects of divorce on some of
the school's students. 68 The Court framed the issue differently than in Tinker,
stating: "The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate
particular student speech-the question that we addressed in Tinker-is different
from the question whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to
promote particular student speech." 69 Instead of applying the substantial disruption
standard under Tinker, the Court found that school administrators do not violate
students' rights in implementing editorial control over student speech when the
school itself is the sponsor of the mode of expression, so long as the schools actions
"are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."70
Despite tipping its hat to the Tinker substantial disruption standard in both
Frazer as well as Frederick, the Court in all of these cases created, in effect,
categorical exclusions for certain types or modes of speech from the protection of
Tinker that is afforded to students. In Frazer.the Court created an exception to the
Tinker rule for cases where the student speech is vulgar, lewd, or obscene. 71 In
Frederick; the Court refused to apply the Tinker standard when the student speech
advocated illegal drug use.72 In Ku/imeier, the Court created a tangential exception
to Tinker in cases of school sponsored student speech. ' Such erratic and

62Morse, 551 U.S. at 408.

6 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kulmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
4Id.at 262.
65

See id

6Id.
67 Id
68

at 263.

id.

69Id.at 270-71.
70Id.at 273.
71See Melinda Cupps Didder, The Morse Quartet:Student Speech and the first Amendment, 53

Loy. L. REV. 355, 365-66 (2007).
72

See id.
at 356.

73Id.at 367-68.
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inconsistent application of Tinker has led to sharp criticism of the Court, and
appeals for a stricter usage of the substantial disruption standard.74
C. Extending/LimitingTinker to Off-Campus Student Speech Cases
Adding to the confusion created by the several exceptions to Tinker is the fact
that the Supreme Court was not instructive to lower courts in how to utilize Tinker
in cases concerning off-campus speech. Varying uses of Tinker in such cases has
been fragmented. 71 Some have completely adopted the Tinker doctrine in offcampus speech cases, such as the United States Central District of California in
jC. v. Beverly Hills Unified School District.76 This case concerned a student who
recorded an off-campus, derogatory conversation between two other students, the
existence of which eventually became known to the student body.7 7 However, other
courts have plainly refused to bend students' free speech protection to the Tinker
rationale, including the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. In Thomas v. Board of
Education, the Second Circuit found that the Tinker doctrine did not apply where
students had created and distributed satirical newspapers almost entirely offcampus. 71 Several courts have faced the issue of expressions of speech that are
created off-campus but later brought on-campus, with many of them applying
Tinker in such scenarios.79 These varying results, reached by different federal
courts, emphasize the difficulty in applying Tinker's "substantial burden" standard
in off-campus speech cases, primarily due to the Supreme Court's lack of guidance.
II. FEDERAL CIRCUIT TESTS FOR PROTECTING STUDENT VIRAL SPEECH
OCCURRING OFF-CAMPUS

The ever-increasing ability of students and peers to interact with one another
without being in the same place, 0 coupled with an inconsistent application of the
7' See, e.g., Matthew Sheffield, Note, Stop With The Exceptions: A Narrow Interpretation of
Tinker for All Student Speech Claims, 10 CARDOZO PuB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 175, 214 (2012)
("Judging all claims regarding student free speech made on school premises by a narrow application of
the standard set forth in Tinker would have one important advantage: clarity, both for courts and school

officials.").
' SeegeneralyMarcus-Toll,supra note 26.
76
J.C.v. Beverly Hills Unied Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2010) ("[Tlhe
geographic origin of the speech is not material; Tinker applies to both on-campus and off-campus

speech.").
77Id. at 1098.

71See Thomas v. Bd ofEduc., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979) ("Here, because school officials
have ventured out of the school yard and into the general community where the freedom accorded
expression is at its zenith, their actions must be evaluated by the principles that bind government
officials in the public arena.").

7 See, e.g., Beverly Hills, 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1107. But see Marcus-Toll, supra note 26, at 3418
("Alternatively, other courts ... have declined to apply Tinker, instead analyzing regulations of such
speech by considering whether the speech at issue constituted a 'true threat.'").
'o Boyd, supra note 46, at 1215-16.

-

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 104

Tinker standard by the Supreme Court, has led to diverging treatment by the
federal circuit courts of cases concerning school disciplinary action for student
online or digital speech occurring off-campus. This section examines the varying
tests developed in the federal circuits, in order of how protective each test is of
student viral speech rights.
A. The Most Protective
The most recent federal circuit to examine the battle between student offcampus viral speech and school disciplinary authority was the Ninth Circuit, in a
8
' Landon Wynar, a high
case called Wynar v. Douglas County School District.
school student at Douglas County High School in Nevada, sent several instant
messages online from his home to his friends through Myspace. 82 Wynar's
communications were initially humorous, but later turned dark." The messages
contained statements regarding weapons and ammunition that Wynar had
collected over a period of time, including at least one semi-automatic rifle. 4 In the
instant messages, Wynar bragged about owning the weapons, going as far as to
threaten using them against specific classmates at Douglas County on a certain
date."5 Frightened, his friends reported what Wynar had stated in these instant
messages to school administrators, who suspended him for ten days.86 The school
board then conducted a formal hearing.87 The board found that Wynar was a
"habitual disciplinary problem" under Nevada state law, 8 under which any student
so deemed could be suspended for not more than a semester. The board expelled
Wynar for 90 days.90
Wynar sued the school district and administrators for violating his
constitutional rights under the First Amendment. 9 The district court granted
summary judgment for the school district, and Wynar appealed. 92 The Ninth
Circuit noted that while the Supreme Court had developed extensive case law on
the speech rights of students inside of the school, there was a lack of precedent
regarding student freedom of expression outside of the school. 93 The Ninth Circuit
" Wynar v. Douglas Cry. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id.at 1065.
93Id.

91Id. at 1065-66.
5

8

Id.

"Id. at 1066.
87Id.
" See id.Landon was charged under a Nevada statute specifically dealing with "habitual disciplinary
problem[s]." NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 392.466(3) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 78th Reg.
h
Sess. (2015) and 291 Spec. Sess. (2015)).
'9 Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1066.
9 Id.

91Id.
92 Id.at1067.

93Id.

2015-2016]

Tinker Tortured

went on to acknowledge what it considered the most comparable case it had ruled
on in the past, La Vine v. Blaine School District.? In La Vine, the Ninth Circuit
considered the constitutionality of expelling a student from school on a temporary,
emergency basis as a result of a poem he had written at home, away from the school
campus. 95 The poem, written in first-person, expressed material about a school
shooting and committing suicide. 96 Although the poem was written entirely at
home, the student eventually brought the poem to school and showed it to his
English teacher, which ultimately led to the school's decision to expel the student.97
Finding that none of the established exceptions to the Tinker standard were
present in the case, the Ninth Circuit in La Vine decided that the school could have
reasonably forecasted substantial disruption as a result of the speech, and no First
Amendment violation had occurred.98 In Wynar, the Ninth Circuit noted that
other courts interpreting La Vine had used it to support the theory that Tinker is
applicable to student speech regardless of whether the speech occurs on or off of
the school campus. 9 Disagreeing with this understanding and treatment of
La Vine, the Ninth Circuit stated that La Vine strictly addressed the situation in
which a student "creates" speech or expression at home, but later brings the
expression to the school campus.1 00 Although noting that this was not a trivial
distinction, the Ninth Circuit extended the analysis it had used in La Vine in
deciding Wynar by focusing on the physical harm that the speech threatened.' t
The court distinguished Wynar (and La Vine) from cases that other circuits had
decided which also concerned student online communications and school
disciplinary authority. 02
' These other cases concerned arguably less serious and
perilous subject matter than what was at issue in Wynar and La Vine (to wit, a
03
student parodying his school principal or making fun of fellow students online).
The Ninth Circuit focused on the physical and potentially fatal danger that
surrounded Wynar's online communications to his friends, and then made "explicit
what was implicit in La Vine. when faced with an identifiable threat of school
violence, schools may take disciplinary action in response to off-campus speech that
meets the requirements of Tinker.' 4 The Ninth Circuit went on to find that these
requirements had been met and held that the school district did not violate
Wynar's constitutional rights in suspending him for his off-campus
communications.105
94Id. (citing LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001)).
9' La Vin4 257 F.3d at 984-85.
96Id. at 983-84.
97Id. at 984-86.
91See id at 990-92.
99
Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1068.
10
0Id.
1ol Id.
102See id. at 1068-69.
10
3 Seeid
1 Id. at 1069.
'05 Id. at 1070-72.
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Essentially, then, the Ninth Circuit's holding remains close to the standard set
out in Tinker, but adds a second, qualifying requirement that the speech involve
some threat of violence occurring on the school campus. The Ninth Circuit was
especially concerned with the escalated frequency of violent attacks at schools,
specifically mentioning the shootings at Columbine High School, Santee High
School, and Newtown Elementary School. 106 In this author's opinion, the Ninth
Circuit undoubtedly reached the correct result in Wynar. As the court observantly
stated, one "'Can only imagine what would have happened if the school officials,
after learning of [the] writing, did nothing about it' and [Wynar] did in fact come
to school with a gun. "107
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of when a school's disciplinary measures for
off-campus expressions may impede on student free speech rights is highly
protective of student speech, and can thus be deemed the most protective of any of
those tests developed by other circuits. Under the Ninth Circuit's current standard,
any speech that falls short of establishing a threat of violence to people within the
school would be protected. Despite what appears to be obvious and correct logic in
the Wynar decision, the fact that the court was unwilling to rule broadly on the
issue of off-campus student speech makes it less useful as precedent for other courts
to look towards in the future. In essence, the W ynar ruling is not entirely
instructive to more common and less extreme situations that other circuits have
faced.108 A student threatening to bring guns on school grounds in order to murder
classmates certainly falls on one side of the line, but the court's failure to otherwise
define how severe the threat of violence must be in order to invoke a school's
authority to discipline off-campus viral speech may leave future district courts in
the dark. 9
B. Protective
In J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District,the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
considered a case in which an eighth-grade student created a MySpace page
making fun of her middle school principal.110 The MySpace page was created at the
student's home computer with the help of a classmate.' The creation of the page
came just months after the petitioner-student had been disciplined by the principal
for dress code violations on two separate occasions. 2 After learning about the
website from another student, the principal met with the school district
106Id.at 1064.
107Id.at 1070 (quoting Boim v. Fulton Cty. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 984 (11th Cir.2007)).
at 1068-69 (citing Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011); J.S. ex
108See id.

rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d
41 (2d Cir. 2008)).
109
See Marcus-Toll, supra note 26, at 3432.
"1oBlue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d at 920.
111M.

1

21d
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superintendent as well as the director of technology.'13 The principal then met with
school guidance counselors and the students, and proceeded to suspend the
students for ten days.114 The students and their parents brought suit, alleging a
violation of the student's free speech rights, but the district court granted the school
district's motion for summary judgment.' The school argued that the required
"substantial disruption" had occurred primarily in two ways. First, students
gossiping about the MySpace page during class hours had made it more difficult for
teachers to instruct.11 6 Second, the school was forced to give some faculty members
certain jobs that would have otherwise been carried out by the guidance counselors
who were busy supervising the principal's meeting with the students informing
117
them of their suspensions.
The Third Circuit heard the case on appeal en banc."' In applying the Tinker
doctrine, the plurality found that there was no reasonable forecast of a substantial
disruption. "' First, the court noted that although the student had posted a
photograph of the principal to the MySpace page (which they obtained from the
school district website), the student did not identify the principal by his name or
location.12' The court found this distinction, which it believed suggested that the
student had not intended for the speech to reach the school, to be very relevant in
its determination. 121 Second, the student had made the MySpace page "private" so
that it was only available to her and her friends. 122 Third, although the court
acknowledged that the website contained some vulgar language, it also noted that
the website was entirely nonsensical, and that no one could have taken it (or did
take it) seriously. 123 Fourth, because the school district blocked school computer
24
access to MySpace, no student could have viewed the profile from the school.
Finally, the court noted that beyond "general rumblings" of the students about the
website and some minor rearranging of faculty duties, no substantial disruption had
actually occurred. 25 The Third Circuit thus reversed the district court's holding
126
that the student's free speech rights were not violated.
The fact that the student had made the MySpace profile "private" was relevant
to the court's findings both as to the student's intent as well as to the issue of

113

d.at 921.

4Id.at 921-22.
11

Id. at 923.

116Id. at

922-23.

7Id.at 923.

Id.at 915.
119See id.at 929-30.

m Id.at 929.
See id
1nId.
12

123Id.
124Id.

w Id.
126Id.at 920.
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whether the school disruption was reasonably foreseeable. 27 This is one example of
how evidence of a student's intent in creating speech may overlap as evidence that
also reveals whether school administrators could have reasonably forecasted a
substantial disruption. For instance, many of the facts the court considered in Blue
Mountain in discerning whether substantial disruption was reasonably foreseeable
by the school administration could also, at least in part, be framed as
circumstantially indicative of the speaker's intended forum, effect, and contextual
audience. 2 Factors such as whether the speaker took affirmative steps to either
expand or confine his or her potential audience,' 29 whether the speaker chose a
mode of a communication that was known to be inaccessible within the school, 30
and whether the speaker had patently focused the speech at a unique association
with the school,"' are all considerations that, under the Third Circuit's analysis,
may circumstantially bear on whether the speaker intended the speech to reach the
school.
The court ultimately concluded that the student had in fact taken steps to
prevent access to the speech by anyone other than her group of friends. 13 2 Adding
this intent-driven factor to the Tinker analysis for off-campus digital speech cases
serves to safeguard student speech beyond the protections that are afforded under
Tinker, as student viral speech that inadvertently ended up causing substantial
disruption on the school campus would be protected. In fact, even some categories
of speech which could reasonably be foreseen to make their way to the school
would likely be protected under this approach, so long as the student in question
did not subjectively intend for it to do so.' 33
This "intent-driven" test is more protective of student speech than those of
most other circuits, but does not quite rise to the level of protection espoused under
the above-discussed "threat of violence" test. Under the intent-driven test, instances
where a student intended for the speech to reach the school may be unprotected,
whereas under the threat of violence test, such speech would only be unprotected if
it presented an identifiable threat of violence to the school." 4 Without a more
See id. at 929-31.
m See, e.g., id. at 930 (stating that it is not enough that students were the intended audience).
Under this rationale, speech targeting students at a forum other than the school would not meet the
requirement of the first prong.
u2 Id. at 929, 930.
m Id. at 921.
131See id. at 929.
132Id. at 930-31.
127

m3See id Blue Mountain is significant to the Third Circuit's jurisprudence for a reason other than
the court's holding. In a separate concurring opinion signed by five judges, Judge Smith wrote that
Tinker was inapplicable in off-campus student speech cases. Id. at 936 (Smith, J., concurring). The
concurrence noted that the principle established in Tinker was "expressly grounded in 'the special
characteristics of the school environment,"' and that extending it further than those boundaries sets a
dangerous precedent that could potentially lead to stricter regulation of adult, public speech. Id. at 937,
940.
CompareWynar v. Douglas Cry. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding
that the subjective intent of the student-speaker was not a determinative issue), with Blue Mountain
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explicit directive on how to prove "intent," however, a wholesale adoption of the
standard set out by the Third Circuit would inherently lead to more issues of what
is necessary to do so. a35 Because the Third Circuit did not sufficiently flesh out
how intent may be shown, schools would conceivably be left powerless in all
incidents in which the student never explicitly and unequivocally made known his
intent for the speech to reach the school, but the circumstances nevertheless
allowed for a strong inference that intent was present. Although not all such
situations would necessitate or justify school action, undoubtedly some would.
Thus, the Third Circuit's approach would provide little relief for school
administrators facing such incidents. Finally, the Third Circuit's analysis is not
entirely transparent about whether the speech must simply target the school or
target a substantial disruption occurring on school grounds. The Third Circuit
would likely be satisfied with a showing that the student targeted the school,'36 but
a more concrete and forthright explanation of how the analysis should be framed
could have saved district courts some grief in the future.
C.Less Protective
The Second Circuit has taken a different approach than Wynar and Blue
Mountain to the regulation of off-campus student speech, largely adopting the
Tinker threshold with a measure of foreseeability added to consideration. In
Doningerv. Niehofi, the most recent off-campus student expression case to come
before the Second Circuit, members of the Lewis Mills High School student
council sent emails to a mass number of people concerning Jamfest, an annual
school battle-of-the-bands event that took place in the school auditorium. 3 7 The
members of the student council helped plan the event each year, although a teacher
at the school was routinely responsible for the operation of the auditorium's sound
and light equipment.138 Due to scheduling conflicts, the teacher that normally
performed this task was unavailable to do so on the date that was originally
reserved for Jamnfest. 139 The students were informed that they would either have to
change the venue of the concert or otherwise move it to another date."4 Deciding
that either one of these alternatives would drastically decrease both the student
attendance as well as band participation of the concert, four members of the
student council convened in the school computer lab and logged in under one of
their fathers' email account. 14' The students wrote a message explaining that
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d at 930-31 (emphasizing the intent behind the student's speech in deciding the
case).
135See Boyd, supranote 46, at1236; Marcus-Toll, supra note 26, at 3433-34.
"36
See Blue Mountain Scb. Dist., 650 F.3d at 930-31.
137Doninger v. Neihoff, 527 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2008).
13

8 See id.
Id.

139
140

Id.

141

Id.
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Jamfest was in jeopardy, asking anyone who read the email to call Superintendent
Paula Schwartz and urge that Jamfest go on as scheduled, and also imploring
readers to spread the email to as many others as possible. 42 The students sent the
email to everyone in the online address book, and also added several other names to
the recipient list that were contributed by one of the involved students. 43 One
student later encountered a school administrator, who had been flooded with
phone calls and emails throughout the day as a result of the student council
message.'" The administrator explained that she was disappointed in the council's
actions that resulted in countless phone calls and emails, that the school was more
willing to work with the students to reorganize Jamfest than the recipients of the
council message were led to believe, and that the students should send out a follow
up message correcting this information.14 5 The student told the teacher she would
comply with this request.'"
Later that night while at home, however, this student posted a message on her
individual blog on the website LiveJournal. 47 The blog post criticized Schwartz
and the school administration and claimed that Jamfest would in all likelihood be
cancelled by Schwartz because she was angry with the students from the backlash
she received as a result of the original council message.'" Several classmates of the
student read the blog post and added their own comments. 4 9 As a result of the
email as well as the blog post, school administrators and the superintendent
continued to receive phone calls and emails. "0 The students and school
administrators met the next day and agreed to reschedule Jamfest for a date in
June.'' However, Schwartz only became aware of the blog post some days after
this meeting.5 2 As a result, when the student who made the blog who was running
for class office came to accept her nomination, she was told that she would be
required to write an apology to Schwartz, show a copy of the blog to her mother,
and withdraw her candidacy.5 3 Although the student went on to win a plurality of
the votes as a write-in candidate, the school refused to allow her to assume the
l4
position.'
The student filed a complaint alleging her First Amendment rights had been
violated, and filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. 5 5 The district court found
142

Se id.
143Id.

144Id.
5
14 Id. at 45.

146
Id.
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that a preliminary injunction was not warranted, as the student had not shown a
substantial likelihood of success. 156 On appeal, the Second Circuit restated its
precedent, set in an earlier case for school discipline of student off-campus
speech.15 7 It noted that if the student had distributed the contents of the blog post
on school grounds, then the case would fall on all fours with Fraserand the school's
action would have been justified. 158 Without defining the precise scope of "lewd"
language, the court felt the language in the blog was "the sort of language that
59

1
properly may be prohibited in schools."

However, it was unclear to the court whether the Fraserdoctrine also applied to
student off-campus speech. a Regardless, the court applied the Tinker threshold,
as well as the extension of Tinker that the Second Circuit had established in
Wisniewski v. Board of Education that set forth the standard for substantial
disruption within the school, and with regard to off-campus speech, found that if it
was reasonably foreseeable that the speech or expression "would come to the
attention of school authorities and that it would create a risk of substantial
disruption." 161Under this test, the school would thus be justified in disciplining the
student and limiting the expression altogether. The Second Circuit agreed with the
district court that this standard was met in the case at bar, relying on the fact that
the student blogger had essentially intended for the blog post to reach the school
campus and that the blog post could have led school administrators to reasonably
anticipate substantial disruption with school proceedings.162 The blog post, echoing
the council email, specifically requested that readers call and complain to the
superintendent and school administrators to increase their frustration.163 The court
also recognized that allowing the student to maintain a student leadership position
despite her recent actions and behavior would give rise to the foreseeable risk of
undermining the student council and faculty relationship, which in turn would risk
even further substantial disruption of school proc eedings. The Second Circuit
1 65
thus affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction.
The Second Circuit's interpretation of when a student's off-campus speech or
expression falls within the domain of school discipline is broader than the tests
established by the Ninth and Third Circuits and is less protective of student viral
156Id.

at 47.

157
Id.at 48 ("We have determined .. .that a student may be disciplined for expressive conduct,

even conduct occurring off school grounds, when this conduct 'would foreseeably create a risk of
substantial disruption within the school environment,' at least when it was similarly foreseeable that the
off-campus expression might also reach campus.") (quoting Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 40
(2d Cir. 2007)).
sI Id.at 49.
159 Id

160
Id.
161Id.at 50-51.

16 Id.at 51.
163
64
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1d. at 45.

Id at 52-53.
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speech rights. Whereas the Ninth Circuit limited the scope of its decision to
incidents of potential violence and danger on the school campus, and the Third
Circuit considered whether the student intended for the speech to reach the school,
the Second Circuit focused its decision on whether or not the student speaker
could have reasonably foreseen that the expression would eventually make its way
to school administrators and in turn cause a substantial disruption to school
activities. At the expense of student speech rights, the Second Circuit's test may
provide some shelter to school administrators to deal with school disruptions that
were not necessarily targeted at the school premises. Consider a student who
cyberbuflies a classmate without necessarily taking any concrete actions that
explicitly reveal he subjectively intended his online speech to reach school grounds.
Such a case would allow for school administrative involvement if it was foreseeable
to the cyberbully that the speech would reach the school. Still, some legal scholars
have criticized the Second Circuit's holding in Doningerfor failing to establish a
definitive and precise threshold, making the argument that in this day and age,
virtually all communications between students outside of the classroom have a
reasonable possibility of reaching the school premises.16 6 Essentially the flip side of
the benefit of the Second Circuit's approach described above, this criticism
encompasses how the Third Circuit's intent-driven test is more protective of
student speech than the foreseeability test established by the Second Circuit. While
arguably all viral speech between students could be reasonably foreseeable to reach
school grounds, certainly not all such speech would be subjectively aimed at school
grounds. A school's authority to discipline a cyberbully for hurtful speech towards
another student that was not intended to reach the school but was nevertheless
reasonably foreseeable to end up there is one thing, but less invidious and
pernicious student speech made with an expectation (albeit incorrect) of remaining
private that did not specifically target the school is quite another.
D. The Least Protective
The Fourth Circuit has also established its own precedent concerning students'
off-campus viral speech rights, holding most closely to the Second Circuit's
standard. In Kowalski v. Berkely County School, a twelfth-grade student named
Kara Kowalski at Musselman High School in Berkeley County, West Virginia
created a group on the social networking site MySpace.com using her home
computer that insulted and degraded another student. i67 Kowalski placed the
acronym "S.A.S.H." as the MySpace group's heading, which Kowalski claimed
stood for "Student's Against Slut's Herpes," but which one of Kowalski's classmates
stated stood for "Students Against Shay's Herpes." 168 The court found that this
primarily referred to another classmate named Shay, who was the main topic of
166

Macus-Toll, supra note 26, at 3430; see also Boyd, supra note 46, at 1236.

167Kowalski v. Berkely Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011).
168 Id.
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discussion on Kowalski's website. 169 Kowalski sent online invitations to roughly 100
of her peers to join and view the website, and roughly two-dozen Musselman High
School students joined. '70 Joining the website allowed its members to post
comments, photographs, and interact with one another. 171 One student who joined
the website posted two different pictures of Shay, both edited, insinuating that
Shay was sexually promiscuous and was infected with herpes. 172 The student who
posted these pictures joined the website from a school computer. 173 Several
classmates made comments on the pictures, further insulting Shay and applauding
both Kowalski and the student who had posted the photos. 174 When Shay's father
learned of the website, he called the student who posted the photos to voice his
anger.7 5 The student then alerted Kowalski, who attempted to delete the website,
and when she was unable to do so, simply changing the name of the page to
176
"Students Against Angry People."
After a meeting and discussion of the web page with Shay's parents, Musselman
High School Principal Ronald Stephens contacted the school board in order to
decide whether this was an incident that warranted school discipline.7 7 Deciding
that the website violated the school's policy against harassment and bullying,
Kowalski was suspended from school for ten days, though this was later reduced to
five days at her father's request.' Kowalski was also suspended from attending any
79
school-sponsored events for ninety days.
Kowalski filed a motion in the district court alleging a violation of her First
Amendment freedom of speech rights, amongst other constitutional claims." The
district court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, finding that her "injury"
could not be cured by a decision in her favor.1"' The district court also granted
summary judgment on Kowalski's remaining claims, and Kowalski appealed the
district court's findings to the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the district court's
holding. "'a The Fourth Circuit framed the issue before them as "whether
Kowalski's activity fell within the outer boundaries of the high school's legitimate
interest in maintaining order in the school and protecting the well-being and
educational rights of its students." 8 3 The court found that, regardless of the
169
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geographic location of Kowalski at the time she created the MySpace page, the
website caused precisely the type of substantial disruption and interference with
school activities that Tinker aimed to exclude from the protections of the First
Amendment.184
On appeal, with regard to the fact that the speech in this case took place over
the Internet, the Fourth Circuit implied that it was a metaphysical issue, and
perhaps impossible to pinpoint precisely where Kowalski's "speech" took place. 85
The court noted that while Kowalski "pushed [the] computer's keys in her home,"
she was aware that most, if not all, of those who received the "speech" would be
outside of her home and possibly even inside the school building.'86 She thus could
have reasonably anticipated the website reaching the school or "impact[ing] the
school environment."" 8 Given the name of the web page itself (Students Against
Sluts Herpes) and the fact that at least one student interpreted the site to center
around Shay, the court reasoned, Kowalski should have known that the impact of
the page "would be felt in the school itself."' 88 After flooding its opinion with
evidence seemingly supporting a school's right to discipline a student for offcampus speech, the court acknowledged that the reach of a school's disciplinary
authority for such speech is not unlimited.' 89 Without drawing a specific line for
where that limit exists, the court found that Kowalski's speech was safely within the
school's authority, stating: "[W]e are satisfied that the nexus of Kowalski's speech
to Musselman High School's pedagogical interests was sufficiently strong to justify
the action taken by school officials."19
The Fourth Circuits "sufficient nexus" test"' , with an added consideration of
whether the student should have known that the speech would reach the school, is
arguably the least protective of student viral speech rights of the various circuit tests
and provides school administrators with the most authority to discipline students
for such speech. Emphasizing the pedagogical interests of the school allows
administrators to protect school proceedings in a way that other threshold tests
would not allow. For example, if the Fourth Circuit had strictly applied the highly
speech protective "threat of violence" test from Wynar and had focused exclusively
on the threat of substantial school violence, it would have assuredly reached the
opposite conclusion, and the severe cyberbullying at hand in Kowalskiwould have
been allowed to continue. On the other hand, if the Ninth Circuit had applied the
Fourth Circuit's approach when it decided Wynar, the court would have reached
precisely the same result, as student well-being and safety is dearly a pedagogical
1'4M.at 574.
"I Id.at 573.
186
&ee id.

Id.
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189
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interest of the school. Establishing a threshold test that addresses such a wide
variety of potential school disruptions, including those seen in Wynar and
Kowalski, is certainly valuable. Still, there are holes in the Fourth Circuit's
"sufficient nexus" test. First, the same shortcomings of the Second Circuit's
approach in considering the foreseeability to the student speaker that the speech
would reach the school grounds is also present here. Furthermore, "pedagogical
interests" is an extremely vague term that the Court did not spend sufficient time
describing. This lends itself to unnecessary restrictions on student speech rights. As
one author questions: "[W]ould a school's interest in shielding its faculty be
sufficient? Or a school's interest in preserving institutional integrity?" 92 Arguably
even minor school disruptions such as the mere rumblings at hand in Blue
Mountain could be characterized as satisfying this "sufficient nexus" test. Such a
reading would unduly impede on student speech rights.
III. LOOSE APPLICATION OF THE BRANDENBURG V OHIOAND TINKER
DOCTRINES IN THE STUDENT OFF-CAMPUS DIGITAL SPEECH CONTEXT

In each of the tests outlined throughout Part II, courts either explicitly or
implicitly adopted elements of the Tinker doctrine for substantial disruption.
Tinker alone, however, nor any of the tests provided by the circuit courts to date,
provide adequate protection for student free speech rights without hamstringing
school administrators. Adopting a loose interpretation of the Brandenburg v. Ohio
imminent lawless action test and combining this test with elements of the Tinker
substantial disruption test would strike the correct balance between student
freedom of speech and undisturbed school proceedings. 193
In Brandenburg, the Supreme Court considered an Ohio statute which
criminalized "'advocat[ing] ...the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage,
violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial
or political reform' and for 'voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group, or
assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal
syndicalism.'" 94 Clarence Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan ("KKK") leader in Ohio,
had invited a Cincinnati television reporter to cover a KKK rally that was to take
place in Hamilton County. 195 At the rally, members of the KKK were filmed

19Id.at 3431.
193Aaron H. Caplan suggests that student speech "that is maliciously intended for the purpose of
disrupting school, and that has a high likelihood of succeeding in its purpose," may be excluded from the

general protection of speaking off-campus. Aaron H. Caplan, Public School Discipline For Creating

UncensoredAnonymous Internet Forums, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 93, 163 (2003). He argues that
such an exception would be applicable in extreme circumstances such as threatening phone calls and
letters to the school or conspiring to bring a bomb to the school. Id at 163-64.
'9 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444-45 (1969) (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2923.13 (West 1958) (invalidated by Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 448)).
195
Id. at 445.
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carrying firearms and burning crosses.' 96 One of the members made mention of
"revengeance" [sic] and announced that the KKK would lead a march on
Washington on the Fourth of July, while another stated negative opinions of
certain ethnic groups. 197 Brandenburg was charged and convicted under the Ohio
Criminal Syndicalism statute, which he appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.'98 The Supreme Court overturned the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute
and reversed Brandenburg's conviction, establishing a new threshold test for
determining the scope of freedom of speech.' 9 The Court announced that
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to
forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.

Most commentators have recognized three prongs within the Brandenburgtest:
speech directed towards inciting lawless action, the likelihood that such action will
occur, and the imminence of the lawless action.20 Replacing intent to cause
imminent lawless action with intent for the speech to reach the school grounds, as
well as replacing "imminent lawless action" with the idea of "substantial disruption"
(as those concepts are understood under the Brandenburg test) provides adequate
protection for student viral speech without hamstringing administrators from
22
maintaining an orderly school environment.
The first prong of this suggested Tinker-Brandenburgtest would consider
whether the viral speaker's speech was directed towards school grounds. Many
federal courts have interpreted the Supreme Court's language of "directed towards"
as being synonymous with intent.0 3 While the Brandenburg test is an extremely
speech protective doctrine, there is an inherent difficulty in proving a person's
subjective intent,2" which has led to some criticism of courts' failures or inabilities
to consider inferential evidence of intent, calling for lessening the perquisite of a

1

%Id.

at 446-47.
19 Id.at444-45.
199Id at 447-49.
20oId.at 447.
2o' See, e.g., Amos N. Guiora, Note, Responses to the Ten Questions, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
5034,5039 (2011).
102 This suggested alteration of the Brandenburgtest would, in effect, do away with the imminence
prong altogether. This is a necessary step given the effect of the Internet to delay and detach when
speech is heard compared to when it is "spoken." Author John P. Cronan contends that the way the
Internet has changed how humans interact is so significant that the Brandenbugformula as it applies to
adults should also be adjusted. John P. Cronan, The Next Challenge for the FirstAmendment The
Framework for an InternetIncitement Standard,51 CATH. U. L. REV. 425,452 (2002).
203 See, e.g., AIl. to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 733 F.2d 1187, 1190 (7th Cir. 1984).
2omSee Martha A. Field, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project: Justice Breyer, Dissenting, 128
HARV. L. REv. 434, 443 (2014).
197Id.
5
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smoking gun. 205 This argument is especially persuasive in the student viral speech
arena for many reasons. First, the Supreme Court has already found that the high
level of protection afforded to adult speech rights is not entirely applicable to
students.20 6 Second, the intended forum/audience of the type of speech at issue 20is7
not as readily identifiable as cases concerning in-person speakers and listeners.
Finally, application of the Brandenburgstandard without allowing208for adjustment
for the Internet Age could render the Brandenburgtest inadequate.
The factors described above in Part II.B, including whether the speaker took
affirmative steps to broaden or restrict those with access to the speech (especially in
relation to the school environment), whether the speaker's chosen mode of
communication was known to be inaccessible inside the school environment, and
whether the speaker had patently focused the speech at a unique relationship with
the school by emphasizing that relationship, make up a strong starting point for
circumstantial evidence that may be relevant to the speaker's intent. Placing greater
reliance on such factors, which tend to circumstantially reveal a viral student
speaker's intended contextual audience and forum, has several benefits. First, it
would help shed light for students on where their viral speech rights stand. Dually,
it would help teachers and school administrators better understand the instances in
which their authority to discipline students to maintain order in school proceedings
overrides a student's free speech rights. Finally, and most importantly, it would
preserve student viral speech rights to the utmost extent that they do not
particularly target the school environment. The second relevant prong to a court's
analysis under the proposed Tinker-Brandenburg test would be whether a
substantial disruption to school proceedings occurred or was likely to occur. As
previously stated, the Tinker doctrine does not require school administrators to be
absolutely certain that a substantial disruption will result from the student's speech
before acting, but rather that the circumstances surrounding the speech give rise to
2 See, e.g., MICHAEL E. HERZ & PETER MOLNAR, THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE
SPEECH: RETHINKING REGULATION AND RESPONSES 195 (2012) ("A significant difference between
the American and the Hungarian 'imminent danger' tests is that in the United States inciting speech can
be restricted only if imminent danger is intended by the speaker, while in Hungary it is enough if the
speaker had to have known that his/her speech caused imminent danger of violence.... [T]here can be
situations when... courts should be able to infer intent."); see also Steven Penaro, Note, Reconciling
Morse with Brandenburg, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 251 (2008). But see Laura W. Brill, Note, The First
Amendment and the PowerofSuggestion: ProtectingWeglgent"Speakers in Cases oflmitative Harm,
94 COLuM. L. REv. 984, 987, 989 (1994) (acknowledging that there are potential benefits in relaxing
the Brandenburg standard, but concludes in cases of harm resulting from mimicry, the pros are
outweighed by the cons).
206 SeeTinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) ("[T]he Court has
repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school
officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the
schools.").
7 See Penaro, supra note 204, at 252. In Reconciling Morse with Brandenburg, Steven Penaro
makes a comparable argument to that espoused in this note in the context of student -promoted illegal
drug use. Id.at 252-53.
See id, at 270; see also Cronan, supra note 201, at 428.
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a mere reasonable forecast that such disruption will occur. 209 While the
Brandenburg test does not require absolute certainty either, "to satisfy
Brandenburg,the plaintiffs . . . have . . . to prove not just that the harm was

foreseeable, but that it was likely to occur."210 Incorporating this element from the
Brandenburg test raises the requisite probability from mere reasonable
foreseeability to a discernable likelihood that a substantial disruption will occur,2
addressing one of the primary weaknesses of the foreseeability approach adopted by
the Second Circuit: that it is reasonably foreseeable that nearly all student viral
speech will eventually make its way to school hallways. The heightened standard
addresses this issue in two primary ways. First, as stated, the requisite probability of
the speech affecting the school is raised from mere reasonable foreseeability to a
discernable likelihood. While it is plausible that all student viral speech may
foreseeablymake its way to the school campus, certainly not all such speech is likely
to make it to the school campus. Second, the event that is found likely to occur
would also need to constitute a substantial disruption as opposed to the speech
merely infiltrating school grounds. Again, while it is plausible to believe most
student viral speech will eventually come to the school campus, not all such speech
would be likely to cause a substantialdisruption to school proceedings. In tandem,
the two prongs balance the policy interests of school administrators in maintaining
school proceedings as well as students in protecting the right to free, viral speech.
Implementing this Tinker-Brandenburgtest for student online speech serves
courts as well as student speakers and school administrators. This test would help
guide judges to a more congruent and less fragmented authority than what the
federal circuits have currently established, and would allow them to reach this result
by utilizing familiar features of judicial analysis, as both Tinker and Brandenburg
are well established precedents within First Amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, in
some ways, Tinker can be interpreted as merely an adjustment in scale to that of
Brandenburg,as opposed to an entirely new threshold test for First Amendment
protection. 22 Further, the proposed Tinker-Brandenburg test gives school
administrators the ability to discipline students for conduct that is not explicitly and
concretely targeted at the school, but does so without declaring open season on the
precious right of student's freedom of speech by requiring that administrators at
least acquire circumstantial evidence that the speech was targeted at the school and
was likely to cause a substantial disruption.
By applying this proposed Tinker-Brandenburganalysis to the fact pattern of
Wynar, a court would likely find that the speech was unprotected. Describing
Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 592 (6th Cir. 2007).
204, at 999.
21 For a discussion of the precise meaning of "likely" in the Brandenburg context, see Thomas
Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror,84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655, 713-15 (2009).
212See Matthew M. Pagett, Note, A Tinker's Damn: Reflections on Student Speech, 2 WAKE
FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 1, 18 (2012) ("With this comparison Justice Stevens suggests that the 7nker
standard, which protects student speech unless it is likely to cause a substantial disruption at the school,
is a sort of modification of the Brandenburgtest.").
20'
21 See, e.g.,
' BriU, supra note
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repeated threats about the murder of specific classmates on particular dates at
school as speech directed at the school is an understatement, and the presence of
such explicit intent would make inquiry into circumstantial evidence of intent
unnecessary. Furthermore, the likelihood of a school disruption prong would also
be satisfied when a student has repeatedly admitted and bragged about owning
dangerous weapons and threatened to bring them to school to use against other
2 13
students.
Likewise, running the Blue Mountain case through a Tinker-Brandenburgtest
would produce the same result the Third Circuit reached, although the first prong
of intent may arguably have been met. Because no explicit intent regarding the aim
of the speech was present, a court would need to consider the circumstantial factors
described earlier to determine if the requisite intent was present. Since those factors
were largely drawn from the Third Circuit's opinion in Blue Mountain, the facts
are inherently applicable. In that factual situation, the student took steps to confine
who could access the speech by making the MySpace page private. Additionally,
the student chose a mode of communication that was inaccessible within the
school, as the district had'blocked access to MySpace from all school computers.214
Finally, the hardest evidential determination would be whether the student patently
targeted the school by emphasizing the unique relationship between it and the
principal. As the Third Circuit noted, the student did not provide any personally
identifying information of the principal, such as his name, location, or even the
name of the school itself. On the other hand, the Third Circuit could have given
more weight (and should have, under a Tinker-Brandenburgtest) to other factors
that did emphasize this relationship. Indeed, the MySpace page included some
information that at least pointed to the principal's capacity as a school
administrator, not the least serious of which was that one of his hobbies was
"hitting on students". This particular factor is, arguably, a closer call than the
Third Circuit was willing to admit, but given that the other factors and
circumstantial evidence relating to intent weigh in the students favor, the first
prong of a Tinker-Brandenburgtest is likely not met here. Furthermore, as the
Third Circuit noted, the substantial disruption that the school claimed had
occurred as a result of the student's viral speech was nothing more than general
rumblings; this too would fail the proposed Tinker-Brandenburganalysis and the
speech would be protected.
An analysis of the Doningerfacts through the Tinker-Brandenburgtest would
also likely result in the same conclusion as the Second Circuit, although the second
prong arguably may not have been met. The court, by finding that it was
213The speech at hand in Wynar would also most likely be unprotected under the "true threat"
exception established in several Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705,
708 (1969); Andrew P. Stanner, TowardAn Improved True Threat DoctrineFor Student Speakers, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 385 (2006) (discussing the true threat doctrine in the context of schools).
114 This fact is certainly helpful, but is more persuasive if the speaker can demonstrate that she was
aware that the viral speech could not be accessed from within the school.
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reasonably foreseeable that the speech would reach the school administrators, noted
that the student's intent was for the speech to reach the school. 1 ' The likelihood of
a substantial disruption is somewhat trickier. The court did not rule forcefully that
the facts in Doningerwere constitutionally protected, regardless of any punishment
that the teachers could have handed down.216 Instead, the court limited itself,
basing its decision "only that based on the existing record," when holding that
"Avery's post created a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption to the work and
discipline of the school."217 Nevertheless, the fact that the school administrators
and teachers had already been "diverted from their core educational responsibilities"
in the earlier emails is strong evidence that continued diversion and disruption
would be likely to result from the comparable online conduct of the blog posts.21
Finally, examining Kowalski under this Tinker-Brandenburgtest would also
likely result in the same decision, but a court would need to rely on circumstantial
evidence in order to find the speech's intended forum. Considering the factors
described in Part II.B above, the student in Kowalski seemingly took no steps
whatsoever to limit those who could access the MySpace page, and in fact took
affirmative steps to significantly broaden its availability. The student invited over
100 people to access the group, and roughly two-dozen who joined attended the
same school as the speaker and the student targeted by the speech. 219 Furthermore,
220
the student created a website that was accessible from the school building.
Finally, the viral speech on the web page targeted an individual connected to the
school and emphasized that relationship."l As the court noted, the original web
page was entitled "Students Against Slut Herpes."1 2 The court also noted that at
least one student interpreted the acronym to actually stand for "Students Against
Shay's Herpes."'n Beyond that, unlike the principal in Blue Mountain, the name of
the student was mentioned and recognized by several students on the web page,
including the student creator. The aggregate of this circumstantial evidence allows
for a strong inference that the student speech was directed towards the school
grounds. Regarding the substantial disruption prong, the court noted that the viral
speech "created 'actual or nascent' substantial disorder and disruption in the

215 See Doninger

v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008).

21

6 Id.at 53.
217

Id.
Id. at 51.
259Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011). It is also unclear from the
court's opinion how the targeted student's parents became aware of the website in the first place. This
may provide even further evidence that the student who created the website attempted to reach as broad
an audience as possible.
220See id. at 568.
221 See id at 573.
222
Id.
22' See id. at 567 (emphasis added).
21
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school."2 2 4

Since actual disruption occurred in the school, the need to consider
whether it was likelythat speech would occur would be unnecessary.
CONCLUSION

The inconsistent application of the Tinker doctrine as a result of varying
exceptions, the increased ability of students to communicate with and about one
another without being in the same location, and the lack of any Supreme Court
precedent regarding student viral expression away from the school's proximity has
led to a jumbled understanding of student free speech in the viral age. The Ninth
Circuit's approach focuses too heavily on requiring an element of violence or
physical harm to the inhabitants of the school in order for administrators to be
justified in taking disciplinary action against the students, thereby excluding many
instances of substantial disruption of school activities and procedure that the
Tinker standard was designed to protect. Other circuit approaches that focus on
the intent and foreseeability of the off-campus speech or expression eventually
reaching the school premises do a better job of protecting the ordinary course of
school activities at the heart of Tinker. These approaches are fairly encompassinga large portion of what students discuss and express to one another outside of
school is likely to end up inside of school, especially given recent technological
advancements that have strengthened students' communication abilities. Such offcampus speech inherently deserves greater deference and constitutional protection
than student speech occurring on school grounds.
By combining the original principles set out in Tinker with the framework of
the Brandenburgimminent lawless action test, the proper balance is struck between
school regulatory authority and student free speech. Interpreting the intent element
of the Brandenburg test with greater .deference to circumstantial evidence that
strongly suggests "directed speech" in instances where intent is not explicitly
established would quell a major shortcoming of the Third Circuit's intent-driven
approach. Furthermore, by raising the standard for forecasting substantial
disruption from reasonably foreseeable to likely to occur, the Tinker-Brandenburg
test provides more protection for viral speech that occurs off of the school campus
than speech that occurs on it, as it deserves. Adopting this modified TinkerBrandenburgtest would serve to end the muddle the circuit courts find themselves
in over student off-campus viral speech by establishing a consistent test that
embodies the fundamental precepts of Tinker, accounts for the greater amount of
deference that off-campus speech warrants, and allows flexibility for the courts to
decide cases on a fact-intensive basis.

I
(1969)).

Id. at 574 (referencing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513

